CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO PRIVACY-MUNICIPAL ROADCity of Akron v. Akron Center
BLOCK TO ABORTION DENOUNCEfor Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court decided in Roe v. Wade' that a
woman has a constitutional right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. 2 In the eleven years since that landmark decision, state and
local governments, in the guise of regulating the performance of
abortions, have developed legislation aimed at undermining this freedom. 3 In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 4 the Supreme Court swept aside several municipal regulations
which obstructed a woman's right to procreative choice, 5 thus reaffirming the principles established in Wade.
In 1978, the City of Akron, Ohio, adopted an ordinance which
regulated the performance of abortions. 6 Three abortion clinics and a
physician who had performed abortions at one of the clinics brought
suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging
the constitutionality of the ordinance. 7 Plaintiffs claimed that the
municipal regulations violated their patients' constitutional right to an
abortion as established in Wade. 8 The dispute centered on the provisions requiring that: 1) all post-first trimester abortions be performed
in a hospital;' 2) no abortions be performed upon an unmarried minor

1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 Id. at 153.
3 See Note, HospitalizationRequirements ForSecond TrimesterAbortions: Forthe Purpose
of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEo. L.J. 991, 991-94 (1983). Some examples include legislation
regarding spousal or parental consent, laws restricting the public funding of abortions, and
provisions requiring the woman's informed consent to the abortion. Id.
103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
Id. at 2495-504.
6 Id. at 2487 (citing Akron, Ohio Ordinance 160-1978 (Feb. 28, 1978) (amending and
supplementing AKRON, OHIO CODE ch. 1870 (1975))). The city council prefaced the ordinance
with several statements, including expressions of concern for maternal health and fetal life, and
an assertion that the physician has a responsibility to protect both during the abortion procedure.
See id. 103 S. Ct. at 2488 n.2.
I Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1198
(N.D. Ohio 1979), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). The defendants were the City of Akron, its Director of Public
Health, its Mayor, and its Public Prosecutor. Id. at 1181. Two parties were permitted to
intervene as co-defendants "'in their individual capacity as parents of unmarried minor daughters of childbearing age."' Id.
Id. at 1198.
Akron Center, 103 S.Ct. at 2488 & n.3. This section provides: "'[n]o person shall perform
or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman subsequent to the end of the first trimester of her
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under the age of fifteen unless the minor obtains either the written
consent of a parent or a court order; 10 3) there be "informed consent"
on the part of the woman;" 4) there be a twenty-four hour waiting

pregnancy, unless such abortion is performed in a hospital."' Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE §
1870.03). The Code defines hospital as "'a general hospital or special hospital devoted to
gynecology or obstetrics which is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals or by the American Osteopathic Association."' Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE §
1870. 1(B)).
10 Id. at 2488 & n.4. Section 1870.05(B) states:
"[n]o physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a minor pregnant woman
under the age of fifteen (15) years without first having obtained the informed
written consent of the minor pregnant woman in accordance with Section 1870.06 of
this Chapter, and
(1) First having obtained the informed written consent of one of her parents or
her legal guardian in accordance with Section 1870.06 of this Chapter, or
(2) The minor pregnant woman first having obtained an order from a court
having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced."
Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE § 1870.05(B)).
I Id. at 2489 & n.5. Section 1870.06 reads:
"(A) An abortion otherwise permitted by law shall be performed or induced
only with the informed written consent of the pregnant woman, and one of her
parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with Section
1870.05(B) of this Chapter, given freely and without coercion.
"(B) In order to insure that the consent for an abortion is truly informed
consent, an abortion shall be performed or induced upon a pregnant woman only
after she, and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have been orally informed by
her attending physician of the following facts, and have signed a consent form
acknowledging that she, and the parent or legal guardian where applicable, have
been informed as follows:
"(1) That according to the best judgment of the attending physician she is
pregnant.
"(2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of conception of her
unborn child, based upon the information provided by her as to the time of her last
menstrual period and after a history and physical examination and appropriate
laboratory test.
"(3) That the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception and
that there has been described in detail the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn child at the gestational point of development at which
time the abortion is to be performed, including, but not limited to, appearance,
mobility, tactile sensitivity, including pain, perception or response, brain and heart
function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external members.
"(4) That her unborn child may be viable, and thus capable of surviving
outside of her womb, if more than twenty-two (22) weeks have elapsed from the
time of conception, and that her attending physician has a legal obligation to take all
reasonable steps to preserve the life and health of her viable unborn child during the
abortion.
"(5) That abortion is a major surgical procedure, which can result in serious
complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and
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period after the woman's consent; '2 and 3 5) fetal remains be disposed
of in a "humane and sanitary" manner.'
Judge Contie, author of the district court opinion, noted that the
Federal Constitution's privacy guarantee protects a woman's abortion
decision from unjustified state interference.' 4 He applied a balancing
test, weighing the degree to which each section of the ordinance
interfered with a woman's right to an abortion against the valid state
interests advanced by that section.' 5 Because of the compelling state

that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological problems she may have, and can result in severe emotional disturbances.
"(6) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to
provide her with birth control information, and that her physician will provide her
with a list of such agencies and the services available if she so requests.
"(7) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to
assist her during pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have
the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or place him or her for adoption,
and that her physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services
available if she so requests.
"(C) At the same time the attending physician provides the information required by paragraph (B) of this Section, he shall, at least orally, inform the pregnant
woman, and one of her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in
accordance with Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, of the particular risks associated
with her own pregnancy and the abortion technique to be employed including
providing her with at least a general description of the medical instructions to be
followed subsequent to the abortion in order to insure her safe recovery, and shall in
addition provide her with such other information which in his own medical judgment is relevant to her decision as to whether to have an abortion or carry her
pregnancy to term."
Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE § 1870.05 [sic]).
I Id. at 2489 & n.7. This section reads as follows:
"No physician shall perform or induce an abortion upon a pregnant woman until
twenty-four (24) hours have elapsed from the time the pregnant woman, and one of
her parents or her legal guardian whose consent is required in accordance with
Section 1870.05(B) of this Chapter, have signed the consent form required by Section
1870.06 of this Chapter, and the physician so certifies in writing that such time has
elapsed."
Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE § 1870.07).
'1 Id. at 2489 & n.8. Section 1870.16 states: "'Any physician who shall perform or induce an
abortion upon a pregnant woman shall insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed
of in a humane and sanitary manner."' Id. (quoting AKRON, OHIO CODE § 1870.16).
14See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1215
(N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), af'd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983).
'" See id. at 1200. Judge Contie reached this formulation after noting that while an absolute
ban on first trimester abortions and regulations granting to third parties a veto power over the
abortion decision could only be justified by a compelling state interest, regulations interfering
with the woman's right to a lesser degree required a lesser demonstration of state interest to
counter the constitutional attack. Id.
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interest in the health of the mother during the second and third
trimesters of pregnancy, 16 the court held the post-first trimester hospitalization requirement to be valid. 1 7 Judge Contie observed that a
state also has an important interest in the health of the mother during
the first trimester. On that basis, he upheld the validity of the section
of the informed consent provision which required the attending physician to disclose the risks associated with the particular pregnancy and
the abortion technique to be used (hereinafter referred to as the
"specific risk section").' 8 In addition, he held the twenty-four hour
waiting period between consent and abortion to be valid, concluding
that the state interest in assuring that the woman's decision was
carefully made justified the added burden imposed on the woman.19
Three of the ordinance's requirements, however, were invalidated. The parental consent provision was held unconstitutional because it gave the parents or the court the right to veto, in all cases, a
minor's informed consent to an abortion. 20 Judge Contie similarly
invalidated that section of the informed consent provision which required the physician to advise the woman that life begins at conception and to disclose a detailed anatomical description of the unborn
2
child (hereinafter referred to as the "general information section") .
16 See Wade, 410 U.S. at 163; cf. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of
Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1204 (N.D. Ohio 1979), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198
(6th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983) (first trimester regulation of
abortion for protection of maternal health an important state interest).
11 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1215
(N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). This result was reached despite plaintiff's argument that
advances in medical technology now made performance of early second trimester abortions as
safe in clinics as in hospitals and that, therefore, the state's interests in protecting the mother's
health should no longer be considered compelling for this stage of the pregnancy. See id.
11 Id. at 1204. The court did recognize, however, the added financial burden imposed upon
the woman by requiring that the information be provided by a physician rather than a counselor. See id.

19 Id.

0 Id. at 1201. The court noted that this provision was inconsistent with the guidelines
established in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.
v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1201 (N.D. Ohio 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 651
F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), aJJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). The Court in
Bellotti stated that a parental consent provision would be valid if it provided an alternative
procedure by which the minor could demonstrate the ability to give informed consent independent of her parents. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text
(discussing Bellotti); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-75 (1976)
(blanket consent requirement invalid).
11 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1203
(N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), af''d in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
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The court concluded that the effect of such a requirement was to
severely restrict the physician's discretion by specifying exactly what
each patient was to be told.22 It additionally held the provision governing disposal of fetal remains void for vagueness because the city
council had failed to detail which methods of disposal were acceptable. 23 All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit .24

The Sixth Circuit found that the balancing test applied by the
district court was inappropriate. 25 Judge Lively, writing for the majority, observed that the relevant inquiry was whether a provision had
a " 'legally significant impact or consequence' " on the pregnant
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 26 He asserted that if the
court had found that there was a legally significant impact, it should
then have applied strict scrutiny to determine whether the provision
was narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. 27 Judge
Lively agreed with the district court that the compelling state interest
in the health of the mother subsequent to the first trimester of pregnancy justified the hospitalization requirement.2 8 The Sixth Circuit
also agreed with the lower court's finding that both the parental
consent requirement and the general information section of the in-

22

See id.

23 Id. at 1206.
24 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1200 (6th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
25 Id. at 1203-04.
20 Id. at 1204 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976)). Judge
Lively noted that the lower court had failed to consider the nature of the intrusion and instead
had concentrated exclusively on the degree of interference each provision imposed on the
abortion decision. Id. He observed that the district court therefore became involved in a
balancing of state interest against the degree of intrusion, when the inquiry should have focused
on whether the nature of the interference made it legally insignificant, thereby not requiring
constitutional analysis. See id. at 1203-04.
27 See id. at 1204. The court explained that the inquiry as to whether the provision is
narrowly drawn involves determining whether it imposes an "undue burden" on the abortion
decision. Id.
28 Id.
at 1210. The court observed th2ft two district courts had determined that because of
recent advances in medical procedures, the state interest in maternal health became compelling
at the 18th rather than at the 12th week of pregnancy. Id. (citing Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488
F. Supp. 181, 194 (E.D. La. 1980), and Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 438 F. Supp. 679, 685-87 (W.D. Mo. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 655 F.2d 848
(8th Cir.), af'd, 664 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1981), aJf'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2517
(1983)). Judge Lively apparently agreed with this rationale but noted that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision reaffirmed the "bright line" drawn in Wade that the state interest in
maternal health becomes compelling subsequent to the first trimester. See id. (citing GaryNorthwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 896-902 (N.D. Ind. 1980),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Gary-Northwest Ind. Women's Servs., Inc. v. Orr, 451 U.S. 934 (1981)).
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formed consent provision imposed significant burdens on a woman's
right to an abortion.29 The court invalidated the regulations, concluding that they were not justified by a compelling state interest.3 0 In
addition, Judge Lively affirmed the district court's holding that the
provision for the humane and sanitary disposal of fetal remains was
31
unconstitutionally vague.

Two elements of the district court's holding were reversed. Judge
Lively noted that the specific risk section of the informed consent
requirement interfered with the medical judgment of the physician in
the same manner as the general information section.32 As no compelling state interest was advanced to justify this interference, 33 the
34
appellate court declared the specific risk section unconstitutional .
Judge Lively similarly reversed the district court's ruling with respect
to the twenty-four hour waiting period, finding that the stipulation
imposed impermissible financial, psychological, and physical burdens
on a pregnant woman, and that the state interest in providing this
"cooling-off period" was not compelling and therefore did not justify
such burdens.3 5 Both the plaintiffs and the City of Akron petitioned
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.36
In Akron Center, the United States Supreme Court went beyond
the Sixth Circuit's decision in reasserting a woman's unfettered right
to an abortion. The Court, affirming all aspects of the circuit court's
holding except one, declared the hospitalization requirement uncon-

21 Id. at 1205-07.
30

Id.

11Id.at
32

1211.

Id. at 1207.

33 The district court had found that a valid state interest in maternal health was sufficient
justification to uphold the constitutionality of this provision. See Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1204 (N.D. Ohio 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
'4 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1207 (6th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
35 Id. at 1208; accord Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1980) (24-hour
waiting period unconstitutional); cf. Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1347-48 (D.N.D. 1980)
(48-hour waiting period unconstitutional). Contra Wolfe v. Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 526 (6th
Cir. 1976) (24-hour waiting period constitutional).
3 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court granted certiorari in light of conflicting
decisions with regard to second trimester hospitalization requirements. Id. Compare Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 1981)
(hospitalization requirement for all post-first trimester abortions invalid), ajf'd, 103 S. Ct. 2517
(1983) with Simopoulos v. Virginia, 221 Va. 1059, 1076, 277 S.E.2d 194, 204 (1981) (hospitalization requirement for all post-first trimester abortions valid), ajfd, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
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stitutional because it did not further a compelling state interest but
37
served only to obstruct the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
The right to privacy 38 is not expressly mentioned in the Federal
Constitution. 39 Nevertheless, as early as 1891 the Supreme Court of
the United States deemed it a principle worthy of protection. 40 In
Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford,4 1 the Court observed that "[n]o
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. ' 42 Although the constitutional basis for this right was unsettled, 43 it was
45
44
held to protect personal decisions relating to marriage, education,
procreation, 46 and contraception. 47 In 1973, the Court held in Roe v.
37 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2496-97. The Court was persuaded that advances in medical
technology had increased the safety of second trimester abortions and that they could be
performed in appropriate nonhospital facilities. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the correct inquiry when examining
the constitutionality of abortion legislation was whether a provision unduly burdened a woman's
fundamental right to an abortion. See id.at 2511 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38 See generally Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 Azuz. L. Rzv. 1 (1979);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890) ("the right to be let
alone").
39 Wade, 410 U.S. at 152.
40 See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 251.
43 The Supreme Court derived a constitutional basis for the right of privacy from, alternatively, the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)
("specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras... [which] create zones of privacy");
the first amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (private possession of obscene
material protected by first and 14th amendments); the fourth amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (fourth amendment protects individuals having reasonable "'expectation of
privacy"' from unreasonable police intrusion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)); the ninth amendment, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (right of
marital privacy protected by ninth amendment); and the 14th amendment, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (restrictions on freedom to marry based on racial classification violates both
equal protection and due process clauses of 14th amendment).
44 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (restrictions on freedom to marry
based on racial classification unconstitutional).
45 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (parents have right to send
children to private school).
4e See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (statute providing for sterilization of habitual criminals invalid).
41 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons unconstitutional). In Eisenstadt, Justice
Brennan observed "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453
(emphasis in original).
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Wade 48 that the right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a
49
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Wade concerned the constitutionality of Texas criminal abortion
statutes which permitted abortion only to save the life of the mother.50
The challenge was brought by an unmarried pregnant woman who
claimed that the statutes violated her right to privacy. 5' Noting the
physical and mental stress that a woman might be forced to endure if
she were prohibited from obtaining an abortion, 52 the United States
Supreme Court held that the right to privacy, founded in the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty," protected a woman's right to an abortion.5 3 The Court held, however, that this right
was not unqualified, but could be limited provided the limitation was
justified by a compelling state interest.5 Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun identified two interests-the protection of maternal
health and the protection of potential life-that would permit state
regulation of abortion. 5 He observed that "[t]hese interests are separate and distinct . . . [e]ach grows in substantiality as the woman

approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
'compelling.' " He then established a framework, based on the
stages of pregnancy, within which varying degrees of state regulation
would be allowed.
Justice Blackmun determined that, in the first trimester of pregnancy, neither the state's interest in maternal health nor its interest in
potential life was compelling.57 Therefore, both the abortion decision

48

410 U.S. at 113. For a general discussion of Wade, see Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest

and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973), and Ely, The Wages of
Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
48 Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
50 Id. at 120.
51 Id. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the right to an abortion
was protected by the ninth amendment and that the statutes infringed upon that right and were
therefore unconstitutional. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222 (1970), aff'd, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). The district court derived support for its ninth amendment position from Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See Wade, 314 F.
Supp. at 1221-22.
52 Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court observed that, in addition to the stress imposed on the
mother, there was also a negative effect on the mother's family. Id.
53

Id.

54 Id. at 154.
55 Id. at 162-63.
5a

Id.

Id. With respect to maternal health, the Court observed that the mortality rate for
abortions performed prior to the end of the first trimester "appear[ed] to be as low or lower than
the rates for normal childbirth." Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
57
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and its implementation "must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician." 58 He concluded, however,
that in view of current medical knowledge, a state's interest in the
health of the mother becomes compelling at approximately the end of
the first trimester. 59 Subsequent to that stage, the state could regulate
the abortion decision to the extent that the regulation related to the
protection of maternal health.6 0 Justice Blackmun also decided that
the state's interest in protecting potential life becomes compelling at
"viability,"'6 and that a state could prohibit or otherwise regulate
abortions subsequent to that point, except where they were necessary
62
to preserve the health or life of the mother.
In the companion case to Wade, Doe v. Bolton,6 3 the Supreme
Court invalidated a Georgia regulation which required that all abortions be performed in accredited hospitals.6 4 Justice Blackmun determined that the provision was inconsistent with the guidelines established in Wade because it applied to abortions performed during the
first trimester of pregnancy, at which time the state does not have a
compelling interest in the health of the mother.6 5 Justice Blackmun
also indicated that due to Georgia's failure to demonstrate that the full
resources of a licensed hospital were necessary to satisfy the state's

"s Id. at 164; see also Cane, Whose Right to Life? Implications of Roe v. Wade, 7 FAM. L.Q.
413, 431 (1973) (a woman's abortion right "vouchsafed to her physician").
50 Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
Id. Requirements governing the qualifications and licensing of physicians performing the
I0
abortions as well as the type of facility in which they were to be performed were noted as
examples of permissible state maternal health regulations. Id.
"' The Court defined viability as the point at which the fetus is capable of meaningful life
outside the womb. See id. Viability is usually placed at 28 weeks, although it can occur as early
as 24 weeks. Id. at 160.
2 Id. at 165. For a discussion of potential problems with using viability as a guideline for
allowing unlimited state abortion regulation, see Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v.
Wade: The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. Rv. 1194, 1202-03 (1982).
The Wade Court declined to address the issue of "when life begins" and acknowledged that
if a fetus was a "person" within the context of the 14th amendment, then its right to life would be
guaranteed specifically by that amendment. Wade, 410 U.S. at 156-57. Upon examination of the
term "person" as used in the Constitution, the Court observed that it had no "possible pre-natal
application." Id. But see Gorby, The "Right" to an Abortion, the Scope of Fourteenth Amendment "Personhood," and the Supreme Court's Birth Requirement, 1979 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1, 3
("concept of 'person' in the fifth and fourteenth amendments includes unborn human life").
-- 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
e4 Id. at 184, 195. The Georgia statute required the "performance of the abortion in a
hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and also accredited by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals." Id. at 184.
"5 See id. at 195.
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legitimate second trimester health interest,66 the hospitalization requirement would be invalid even if it applied only to post-first trimester abortions. 7 He acknowledged, however, that a state could adopt
licensing standards for post-first trimester abortion facilities, 68 provided those standards were legitimately related to safeguarding maternal health.6
Three years later, the constitutionality of several state roadblocks
to abortion which had not been addressed in either Wade or Bolton
were decided in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.70 At issue were
Missouri regulations containing provisions which, inter alia, governed
informed and parental consent and prohibited the use of a particular
abortion technique. 71 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
informed consent provision which required that a woman certify her
consent to a first trimester abortion in writing.72 The Court recognized that the state has an interest in assuring that a woman's abortion
decision is made with full knowledge of the consequences. 73 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the Court, observed that a regulation affecting
the first trimester of pregnancy was not unconstitutional per se and
that Missouri's informed consent provision had no significant impact
4
upon a woman's decision to abort.
The parental consent provision required unmarried women under the age of eighteen to obtain the written consent of a parent before

Id. Justice Blackmun agreed with appellants' argument that other facilities besides hospitals were qualified to perform second trimester abortions. See id. He also observed that Georgia
permitted nonabortion surgery in nonaccredited facilities provided that the other licensing
requirements were met. See id. at 193.
67 See id. at 195.
" Id. The Court used the term facilities to refer to both hospitals and clinics. Id.
69 Id.
70 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Justice Blackmun, author of the decision, observed that Danforth was
a "logical and anticipated corollary" to Wade and Bolton. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 55. See
generally Note, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth: Resolving the Antinomy, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
425 (1977).
71 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 58-59.
72 Id. at 65. The provision required that the "woman, prior to submitting to an abortion
during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, must certify in writing her consent to the procedure and
'that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion."' Id. (quoting
H.R. 1211, 77th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3(2)). For a general discussion of the issue of informed consent,
see Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscription of State Intervention by the Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REv. 681 (1981).
73 See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67. The Court noted that the stressful nature of the abortion
decision made such knowledge imperative. Id.
" See id. For similar reasons, the Court upheld another section of the statute that required
the physician to keep records of first trimester abortions. See id. at 81. Justice Blackmun noted
that the records requirement was related to the state's interest in protecting maternal health, and
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a first trimester abortion could be performed. 75 In holding this provision unconstitutional, the DanforthCourt concluded that the state did
not have the authority to delegate to a third party an "absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's [first trimester] pregnancy. .... ,7.
Although Justice Blackmun recognized the state's authority to regulate
the activities of minors as distinguished from adults, he nevertheless
felt that there was insufficient justification to support Missouri's blanket restriction. 77
Missouri's legislation also prohibited the use of saline amniocente78
sis as a technique for abortions performed after the first trimester of
pregnancy. 79 Justice Blackmun noted the popularity and safety of the
banned method and observed that other techniques of comparable
safety were generally unavailable.8 0 He concluded that since the restriction was arbitrary and served only to inhibit the vast majority of
post-first trimester abortions, it was not reasonably related to the
protection of maternal health and was therefore unconstitutional. 8'
In Bellotti v. Baird,8 2 decided in 1979, the Court struck down a
Massachusetts first trimester parental consent provision which allowed minors who were denied their parents' consent the right to
obtain court orders for abortions . 3 Justice Powell, who authored the

he concluded that the provision imposed no legally significant impact upon either the physicianpatient relationship or the abortion decision. Id.
75 Id. at 72. The district court had decided that the provision was constitutional because of
the state's interest in protecting parental authority. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 392 F.
Supp. 1362, 1370 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
78 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
"' See id. at 74-75. The Court did recognize, however, that not every minor was capable of
giving informed consent. See id. at 75; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (minors
are less likely to be capable of informed consent).
78 Saline amniocentesis involves the replacing of the amniotic fluid with a saline or other
solution, thereby inducing labor. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76.
79 Id. at 75-76.
80 Id. at 77-78. The appellants had asserted that the other abortion techniques available were
significantly more dangerous than saline amniocentesis and that the one safe alternative was not
widely used. Id. Appellants also pointed out that approximately 70% of post-first trimester
abortions in the United States were effected through saline amniocentesis. Id. at 76.
81 Id. at 79.
82 443 U.S. 622 (1979). For a general discussion of Bellotti, see Note, Where for Art Thou
Danforth: Bellotti v. Baird, 7 PEPPMDINE L. Rzv. 965 (1980).
83 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 624. The provision provided that:
"If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent
of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is
required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be
obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown ..
"
Id. at 625 (quoting MAss. GEN'. LAWS ANN., ch. 112, § 125 (West Supp. 1979)). The provision
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plurality opinion, acknowledged that since the Constitution protected
minors to a lesser degree than adults, the state had the authority to
more closely regulate the activities of minors. 84 He noted, however,
that under Danforth a state could not justify parental consent requirements which granted third parties an arbitrary power to veto the
minor's abortion decision. 5 Balancing these positions, Justice Powell
reasoned that the state could, without requiring parental notification
of pregnancy, restrict the abortion right of immature minors if it
provided a judicial proceeding at which a minor could demonstrate
either that she was mature enough to make an independent abortion
decision or that the abortion would be in her best interest. 88 Since the
challenged provision was inconsistent with these guidelines, it was

declared unconstitutional .87
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the physician's central role in a
woman's abortion decision8 8 in Colautti v. Franklin,89 decided the
same year as Bellotti. The dispute in Colautti concerned a Pennsylvania law which required a physician to determine whether a fetus was
viable and, if so, to use an abortion method reasonably calculated to
protect the life and health of the fetus.9 0 The statute subjected physi-

differed from the one held unconstitutional in Danforth in that it allowed the minor to obtain a
court order for an abortion if her parents denied their consent. Compare id. with Danforth, 428
U.S. at 72.
84 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. Justice Powell stated three reasons for this conclusion,
including the vulnerability of children, the importance of parental authority in childrearing, and
the inability of children to make critical decisions having potentially serious consequences. Id.
83Id. at 643. Although the Court acknowledged that the statute permitted a minor to obtain
a court order for an abortion if her parents denied their consent, the Court noted that it was
unrealistic to believe that this provided an effective avenue of relief since the minor's parents
would now be aware of her pregnancy and could obstruct her access to a court. See id. at 646-47.
88 Id. at 647-48. Justice Powell further commented that if it was determined that the minor
was immature and that the abortion was not in her best interests, the court could either deny
permission for the abortion or defer decision until a parental consultation with court participation had occurred. Id. at 648.
V7See id. at 651.
88 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); cf. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8 (attending
physician should not be placed in "undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket"); Bolton, 410 U.S.
at 192 (physician should be given "the room he needs to make his best medical judgment").
89 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
90 Id. at 380-81, 380 n.1. The Pennsylvania statute reads as follows:
"Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have
made a determination based on his experience, judgment or professional competence
that the fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable or if
there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that
degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life
and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion
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cians to civil or criminal liability if the viability determination was not
made, the proper degree of care was not exercised, or the wrong
abortion technique was chosen. 9 ' Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, underscored the important role of the physician in the abortion decision9 2 and emphasized that the decision to terminate a pregnancy was inherently a medical one. 9 3 Noting that the viability determination was subjective and based on imprecise variables,9 4 the Court
reasoned that a determination of viability could vary among physicians and that therefore, the Pennsylvania statute was void for vagueness. 9 5 Justice Blackmun further affirmed the physician's significance
to the abortion process by stating that any state regulation would be
unconstitutional if it did not furnish the attending physician with
'the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.' "96
In Akron Center, the Supreme Court strongly reaffirmed the
validity of Wade and its progeny. After acknowledging that the Wade
decision's protection of a woman's fundamental right to an abortion
had been criticized,9 7 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, followed the doctrine of stare decisis and applied Wade's trimester analysis as a foundation against which to evaluate each of the disputed
Akron provisions. 8
In holding that Akron's second trimester hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional, Justice Powell relied on the state of medi-

technique employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the
fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in
order to preserve the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 380 n.l (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977)). Viability was defined
as "'the capability of a fetus to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid."' Id. at
381-82 (quoting Wade, 410 U.S. at 160).
91 Id. at 381 & n.1.
'2 See id. at 396-97.
93 Id. at 387 (citing Wade, 410 U.S. at 166).
"I Id. at 395-96. The Court listed several variables, including age of the fetus, fetal weight,
the woman's health and nutrition, and the quality of medical facilities available. Id.
05 See id. at 396. Justice Blackmun also observed that the combination of disagreement by
experts over whether a fetus had attained viability and the strict imposition of civil and criminal
liability for an erroneous determination would make physicians reluctant to perform abortions
when viability was approaching. Id.
:6 Id. at 397 (quoting Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192).
7 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2487. Justice Powell also mentioned that the Court had been
called upon several times in the past to define limits of the state's power to regulate abortions. Id.
08 See id. Justice Powell observed that the care with which Wade was originally considered
and decided and the consistency with which it has subsequently been applied were especially
compelling reasons to adhere to stare decisis in the present case. Id. at 2487 n. 1.
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cal technology at the time of the dispute.99 The Court observed that,
since the Wade decision a decade earlier, the safety of second trimester abortions had dramatically increased, due in large part to the wide
use of the dilatation and evacuation (D&E) procedure.' 0 0 The D&E
procedure, Justice Powell noted, was Utilized in the early stages of the
second trimester (twelve to sixteen weeks), a period during which
other second trimester abortion techniques could not be used.' 0 ' The
Court further observed that the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Public Health Association (APHA) had determined that it was no longer necessary for all
second trimester abortions to be performed in hospitals because experience had indicated that the D&E procedure could be performed
02
safely in suitable nonhospital facilities on an outpatient basis.'
Justice Powell reaffirmed that the state's interest in protecting
maternal health became compelling at the beginning of the second
trimester, but he insisted that the state tailor its maternal health
legislation to the period in the trimester during which its interest
would reasonably be furthered.' 0 3 He determined that such regulation
should not apply if it required a "depart[ure] from accepted medical
practice."' 0 4 In light of the safety of the D&E method in the early
weeks of the second trimester, Justice Powell concluded that Akron's
hospitalization requirement "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessi-

" See id. at 2496; cf. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163 ("present medical knowledge" sets the end of the
first trimester as the point at which the state's health interest in the mother becomes compelling).
For the full text of the provision, see supra note 9.
100Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2495-96. Dilatation and evacuation is a procedure by which a
woman's cervix and the opening to the uterus are dilated and the fetus is removed by means of
suction and instruments. Note, supra note 3, at 1000 n.52. The D&E procedure was utilized only
in the performance of first trimester abortions at the time that Wade was decided. Akron Center,
103 S. Ct. at 2496 n.23.
101Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2496. The Court observed that the other primary second
trimester abortion techniques were instillation procedures which could not be performed prior to
approximately the 16th week of pregnancy because the amniotic sac was too small. Id. at 2496
n.24.
102 Id. at 2496. The ACOG indicated that abortions could "be performed safely in 'a hospitalbased or in a free-standing ambulatory surgical facility, or in an out-patient clinic meeting the
criteria required for a free-standing surgical facility'" up until the 18th week of pregnancy. Id.
(quoting AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR OBSTETRICGYNECOLOGIC SsEvcEs 54 (5th ed. 1982)). At the time of Wade, both the ACOG and APHA had
recommended that post-first trimester abortions be performed in hospitals. Id. at 2495; see
Wade, 410 U.S. at 144-46.
103 See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2497 & n.27.
104 See id. at 2493, 2496-97.
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ble, and safe abortion procedure."' 0 5 Therefore, he held that the
provision was an unreasonable infringement upon a woman's right to
an abortion.1 06

Justice Powell next examined the provision which prohibited the
performance of abortions on minors under age fifteen absent parental
consent or court order. He commented that, as worded, the provision
assumed that no such minor was sufficiently mature to make an
independent abortion decision, thereby leading to the conclusion that,
without parental approval, an abortion could never be in the minor's
best interests.10 7 Justice Powell agreed with both the district and
circuit courts that the unavailability of a procedure by which a minor
under age fifteen could demonstrate that she was mature enough to
make an abortion decision independent of both the court and her
parents rendered Akron's provision unconstitutional under Bellotti
and Danforth.0 8
The Court acknowledged that the state had an interest in ensuring that a pregnant woman's consent to an abortion was informed. 0 9

Id. at 2497. Justice Powell noted that the disputed provision had "'the effect of
inhibiting ... the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks."' Id. (quoting Danforth,
428 U.S. at 79).
106 Id. Justice Powell noted that the Court's holding did not mean that there were no
circumstances under which a state could require the full services of a hospital in the performance
of abortions, but that the Court was concerned only with hospitalization during the early weeks
of the second trimester. Id. at 2497 n.27. He also observed that a state could still, after the first
trimester, "'adopt standards for licensing all facilities where abortions may be performed so long
as those standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish."' id. at
2496-97 n.26 (quoting Bolton, 410 U.S. at 194-95).
The Court also invalidated a second trimester hospitalization requirement in one of two
companion cases to Akron Center, Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). As in Akron Center, Missouri's legislation did not take
cognizance of outpatient facilities, id. at 2520 & n.6, and this proved to be the critical distinction
from Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983) in which a hospitalization requirement was
upheld. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540. In Simopoulos, Justice Powell noted:
Unlike the provisions at issue in City of Akron and Ashcroft, Virginia's statute and
regulations do not require that the patient be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the
abortion be performed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the State's
requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in licensed clinics appears
to comport with accepted medical practice, and leaves the method and timing of the
abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the patient.
105

Id.

I'0 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2498.
108 See id. at 2497-98; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48; see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75
(blanket provision requiring parental consent prior to performance of abortion unconstitutional).
Justice Powell resolved that the ordinance did not imply that a state court had the authority to
make an inquiry into the maturity or emancipation of a minor. See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at
2498.
109See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2498; see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 85 (upholding
informed consent provision).
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Nevertheless, Justice Powell set forth two reasons for invalidating the
general information section of Akron's informed consent provision."'
First, he observed that much of the required information, including
the portrayal of a fetus as a human life, clearly was designed not to
inform the patient but rather to convince her to forego the abortion. 1 I
Second, Justice Powell insisted that the responsibility for ensuring
informed consent rested with the physician, not the state, and that
accordingly, the physician should be permitted to determine, on a
case by case basis, what information is necessary to guarantee that the
decision be made with an appreciation of the consequences." 2 The
Akron provision was unreasonable in that it delineated the information to be conveyed to the pregnant mother, thus removing the doc3
tor's discretion as to what information was appropriate to relay."
In considering the specific risk section of the informed consent
provision, Justice Powell disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's determination that this section infringed upon the physician's discretion in the
same manner as the general information section." 4 He decided that
the specific risk section properly allowed the physician to determine
the precise nature and scope of the information to be relayed and
consequently was not an unconstitutional infringement upon the physician's medical judgment."1 5 Justice Powell took exception, however,
to the section's requirement that the information be disclosed only by
the attending physician."' He concluded that the regulation should
have focused on whether the woman received the information from a
qualified counselor rather than on the counselor's identity.1 7 He
noted that it was within the state's authority to place upon the physician the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that adequate counseling
had been provided either by the attending physician himself or by a
competent party; further, he indicated that the state could establish
minimum standards for those individuals who act as counselors.", 8
Since the section precluded information from being disclosed by any

110Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2501.
111Id. at 2500.
12 Id. at 2500-01.
13 See id.; see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8 (physician should not be placed in "undesired
and uncomfortable straitjacket").
114 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2501.
Id.

Id. In this respect Justice Powell agreed with the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 2501-02.
M See id. at 2502. But cf. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387 (physician plays central role in counseling
women about whether to have abortion).
18 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2502.
11
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person other than a doctor, regardless of such person's qualifications,
Justice Powell found the requirement unreasonable and therefore un9
constitutional. 11
Justice Powell affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision that Akron's
mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period between the time of
20
consent and the performance of the abortion was unconstitutional. 1
He determined that the state did not have a legitimate interest in
assuring that the woman carefully consider her decision to have an
abortion.' 2 ' Justice Powell asserted that once the decision to have an
abortion had been made, based on consultation between the physician
and patient, it was the physician's responsibility to advise the patient
22
as to whether it would be in her best interests to delay the abortion. 1
The Court refused to uphold the mandatory waiting period because it
interfered with the physician-patient relationship.123
Justice Powell also agreed with the lower courts that the Akron
provision governing the disposal of fetal remains was void for vagueness. 2 4 He reasoned that, in view of the imposition of criminal liability, the uncertainty surrounding the terms "humane" and "sanitary"
was fatal because it failed to give a physician " 'fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden.' ",125 Justice Powell noted that
Akron was free to draft more carefully worded regulations that furthered the legitimate state interest in the appropriate disposal of
26
aborted fetuses.

11

Id. at 2503.

12oSee id.
121

See id. The Court thus disagreed with the district court which had found a legitimate state

interest in ensuring "that a woman's abortion decision is made after careful consideration of all
facts applicable to her particular situation." See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v.
City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, 1204 (N.D. Ohio 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 651 F.2d
1198 (6th Cir. 1981), aJJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Justice Powell
additionally noted that the requirement neither served a health interest, see Akron Center, 103 S.
Ct. at 2503; accord Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d
1198, 1208 (6th Cir. 1981) (no "medical basis" in mandatory waiting period), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983), nor furthered the legitimate state interest in ensuring a woman's
informed consent. Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2503.
122 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2503 (citing Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387).
123 See id. Justice Powell apparently agreed, however, with the ACOG's recommendation that
a clinic grant an appropriate amount of time for the woman to reflect prior to an informed
decision. Id. at 2503 n.43. He observed that, contrary to Akron's requirement, the ACOG
standard was flexible and allowed for a variation in the time depending upon the particular
circumstances of an individual patient. Id.
124 Id. at 2504.
155Id. (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
126 Id. at 2504 & n.45. Justice Powell noted that proper disposal of fetal remains regulations
avoid placing criminal liability on the physician for improper compliance. See id. at 2504 n.44;
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In a dissenting opinion, 27 Justice O'Connor virtually rejected
Wade's trimester framework. 128 The dissent argued that the majority's
examination and acceptance of technological advancements "blurred"
the lines between permissible and impermissible maternal health regulation. 29 She reasoned that, as a result, "the State must continuously
and conscientiously study contemporary medical and scientific literature in order to determine whether the effect of a particular regulation is to 'depart from accepted medical practice' insofar as particular
procedures and particular periods within the trimester are concerned."130 Justice O'Connor additionally enunciated her view of the
danger inherent in relying upon "viability" as the point at which the
3
state's interest in the protection of potential life became compelling, ' '
reasoning that advances in medical technology would result, over
time, in viability occurring at an increasingly earlier point in the
pregnancy. 32 Justice O'Connor thus anticipated a problem resulting
from medical improvements that would push forward the point at
which the protection of maternal health would become compelling,
and conversely, improvements that would push back the point of
3
viability, at which stage abortions could be prohibited. 1
Contrary to the Wade holding that the state's interest in the
protection of maternal health and fetal life becomes compelling at
different stages of pregnancy, Justice O'Connor urged that these interests are compelling throughout pregnancy. 3 4 She cautioned, however,
that strict scrutiny should not immediately apply to all abortion legislation. 3 5 Justice O'Connor determined that before legislation could be

see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 572-73 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(Pennsylvania fetal remains disposal statute which did not impose criminal liability held constitutional), af'd mem. sub nor. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
127 Justices Rehnquist and White joined in the dissent. They were the only dissenters in Wade.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 113.
12' See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2505-06 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119Id. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130 Id. Justice O'Connor noted the difficulty inherent in this type of legislative inquiry. Id. She
observed, however, that even with these difficulties, the legislature, with its greater resources,
was better equipped to make the examination than the Court. Id. at 2506 & n.4 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
131 Id. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found it reasonable that fetal
viability may soon occur during the first trimester.Id.; see also id. at 2507 n.5 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing several references supporting this view).
133 Id. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, supra note 62.
13 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2507 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2508-09 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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subjected to a compelling state interest analysis, the legislation first
had to be shown to be an "'unduly burdensome interference"' with a
woman's freedom to have an abortion. 13 Based upon her review of
several of the Court's decisions, Justice O'Connor observed that an
undue burden generally involved137"absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision.
Utilizing this standard, Justice O'Connor found none of the Akron provisions to be unconstitutional. She asserted that the post-first
trimester hospitalization requirement was valid because it was reasonably related to the state's legitimate interest in the health and welfare
of its citizens and did not unduly burden a woman's access to an
abortion.138 In deciding that the requirement protected a legitimate
state interest, Justice O'Connor relied on Bolton's consideration of all
medical factors pertinent to the patient's well-being-psychological
and emotional as well as physical13 9-and the ACOG's opinion that
dissenting) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
136 Id. at 2509 (O'Connor, J.,
(emphasis added)). Justice O'Connor observed that Justice Powell, author of the Akron Center
majority opinion, had previously expressed the view that the compelling state interest test be
applied with deliberate restraint. Id. at 2510 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)).
Justice O'Connor reasoned that because of the nature and scope of the right to an abortion,
the unduly burdensome standard was particularly appropriate. Id. She contended that Wade did
not intend an unqualified right to an abortion, but rather a protection against state action that
drastically limited or restrained the abortion decision. Id. at 2510-11 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 328 (1980) (White, J., concurring) (legislation invalid if it
imposed "coercive restraint" on abortion decision); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977)
(legislation invalid if it drastically limits availability of abortions); and Danjorth, 428 U.S. at 71
n.11 (legislation invalid if it imposes "absolute obstacle" to abortion)). She concluded that a
regulation was not automatically invalid simply because it inhibited abortions. Id. at 2511
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981)).
131 Id. Justice O'Connor cited the parental consent statute of Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622, as an
example of a regulation which posed an absolute obstacle to abortions. Akron Center, 103 S.Ct.
at 2511 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She also argued that the only example of the Court striking
down abortion legislation which was not unduly burdensome was in Bolton, 410 U.S. at 179.
Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2511 n.9 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor contended
that the first-trimester hospitalization requirement in Bolton was not unduly burdensome and
that the Court invalidated the legislation only because of the differential treatment of abortions
as opposed to other medical procedures. Id.; see also Bolton, 410 U.S. at 193. She also expressed
the opinion that decisions subsequent to Bolton rejected such differential treatment of abortions
as a ground for invalidating abortion legislation. Akron Center, 103 S.Ct. at 2511 n.9 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 480 (1977); and Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67, 80-81).
Justice O'Connor further reasoned that "'[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to finetune its statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions,"' and that, to the contrary, the state's
interest in encouraging childbirth is rationally related to the proper state goal of protecting
potential life. Id. at 2512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325
(1980)).
"I Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
13'See Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192.
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midtrimester abortions would remain more hazardous despite advances in medical technology. 140 In addition, she concluded that the
increased cost resulting from this regulation was not unduly burdensome after observing that any regulation that the Court would allow,
including licensing procedures, would necessitate an increase in
cost. 141

Asserting that Akron's informed consent provision was constitutional, Justice O'Connor noted that previous Court decisions had
upheld the validity of informed consent requirements, 142 and concluded that since the sections in issue 1 43 imposed no drastic limitation
44
or undue burden on the abortion decision, they were valid. 1 Similarly, Justice O'Connor would have upheld the mandatory twentyfour hour waiting period, reasoning that the additional cost neither
"unduly burden[ed] the availability of abortions [n]or impose[d] an
absolute obstacle to access to abortions."'14 After referring to the
ACOG recommendation, cited by Justice Powell, that there be sufficient reflection time before the abortion decision was made, Justice
O'Connor observed that, since Akron's requirement did not apply to
medical emergencies, the physician was permitted to override the
waiting period if he determined that such a measure was necessary. 146
Justice O'Connor also concluded that even if the requirement was
unduly burdensome, the state's compelling interest in maternal health

Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). Justice O'Connor also took
exception to the majority's application of "reasonably relates" as applied to the state's compelling
interest in maternal health. Id. at 2513 n.l (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). She reasoned that under
a normal interpretation of the phrase, Akron's hospitalization requirement obviously related to
maternal health. Id.
14
Id. at 2512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that in the companion case
to Akron Center, Simopoulos v. Virginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983), the Court upheld stringent
licensing requirements that would clearly increase the cost of an abortion. Akron Center, 103 S.
Ct. at 2512 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540).
Justice O'Connor also observed that the majority's reliance on the decreased availability of
abortions because of the post-first trimester hospitalization requirement was misplaced, since
there was no evidence introduced that the two Akron hospitals denied second trimester abortions
to any woman or that hospitals in nearby areas would not perform second trimester abortions.
Id.
142 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2515 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at
65-67).
justice O'Connor severed three subsections of the informed consent provision which had
J43
been conceded as unconstitutional by Akron. Id. But cf. id. at 2501 n.37 (majority's refusal to
sever subsections because information had to be given by attending physician, making all sections
unconstitutional regardless of severance).
144 Id. at 2515 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2516 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140

148

Id.
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and potential life justified the regulation. 147 She noted that the waiting period was a minor cost to impose to ensure that a woman's
decision be "well-considered in light of its certain and irreparable
consequences on fetal life, and the possible effects on her own.' ' 48
The dissent additionally reasoned that the Court should have
abstained from holding the parental consent provision unconstitutional. 49 Justice O'Connor noted that abstention is proper "'where an
unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state
judiciary "which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for
federal constitutional adjudication or at least materially change the
nature of the problem."' " 15 0 She noted that Ohio courts might construe the statute in such a way that it would meet constitutional
standards. Accordingly the majority's adoption of an unconstitutional
15
interpretation was an improper intrusion into state matters. '
Finally, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's determination that the provision governing the disposal of fetal remains was
void for vagueness,1 52 noting that a similar provision had been upheld 53 in Planned ParenthoodAssociation v. Fitzpatrick.'4 In Fitzpatrick, the state had indicated that the intent of its "humane disposal" provision was "to preclude the mindless dumping of aborted
fetuses on to garbage piles.' 55 Since Akron had insisted that the intent
of its provision was the same as that upheld in Fitzpatrick, Justice
6
O'Connor would have held this provision to be valid.15
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Id. Justice O'Connor found the majority's reliance on the sanctity of the physician-patient
relationship difficult to understand. Id. at 2515-16 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). She apparently
agreed with the circuit court's observation that "'thedoctors at Akron Center's clinic did little, if
any, counseling before seeing the patient in the procedure room" and that Akron's ordinance
merely took those realities into account. Compare id. with Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1217 (6th Cir. 1981) (Kennedy, J.,concurring in
part, dissenting in part), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
149 Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2513 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150 Id. (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1977) (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360
U.S. 167, 177 (1959))). Justice Powell had refused to apply the abstention principle to the
parental consent provision because the section created no procedures by which a state court
interpretation of the provision could be made. Id. at 2498. But see id. at 2513-14 & n.12
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (state juvenile court might have authority to make proper determinations).
" See id. at 2514 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152Id. at 2517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2516 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975), af'd mem. sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S.
901 (1976).
155 Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 573.
'5
Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2517 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Abortion has always been an emotionally charged and highly
controversial issue, 15 7 and the Court has been called on repeatedly to
weigh and balance the competing interests of a woman's right to
exercise control over her own body and the state's authority to regulate the performance of abortions. 5 8 The majority's decision in Akron
Center is a reasonable application of the principles established in
Wade and its progeny. The Court appropriately has reaffirmed that a
woman's qualified right to choose to terminate her pregnancy is constitutionally protected and that efforts by the state to infringe unreasonably upon the exercise of that right will be rebuffed.
Justice O'Connor's sharp criticism of the foundation on which
Justice Powell based his holding warrants closer examination. Justice
Powell adopted a limited interpretation of Wade by indicating that
maternal health restrictions should not arbitrarily be applied to the
entire second trimester, but that the state should limit the regulation's
effect to that point in the trimester where its interest is served. 159
Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's reliance on medical technology to determine when the maternal health interest is advanced
blurs the lines developed by Wade to guide the state's determination
of permissible regulation. 60 As a result, Justice O'Connor contended
that states are "no longer free to consider the second trimester as a unit
and weigh the risks posed by all abortion procedures throughout that
trimester."' 6 '
See generally Wade, 410 U.S. at 12S-52 (discussing history of abortion); Destro, Abortion
and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250
(1975); Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of The Legitimacy
of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 811.
'5
See supra notes 70-96 and accompanying text. Emphasis on either of those two interests
leads to rather intriguing arguments. For example, one issue which has not yet been judicially
addressed is a woman's right to secure an abortion without consulting her physician (i.e.,
abortion on demand). Cane, supra note 58, at 431. The author observes that the woman's rights
"are vouchsafed to her physician. The abortion decision is not hers, really. She now has the right
to request an abortion; the physician, in what the Court perceives to be infinite wisdom, may
comply with that request or refuse it." Id. At the other extreme, there is the state's potential
authority to compel abortion in an effort to protect its legitimate interests. Swan, Compulsory
Abortion: Next Challenge to Liberated Women?, 3 OHio N.U.L. REv. 152 (1975). The author
reasoned:
If the state has the right to intervene in a mother's body for state interests . . . and if
a valid health definition includes psychological and familial health . . . the state
seems potentially empowered to demand abortion of sickly women threatened by
childbirth. The state may possibly be empowered to demand abortion of even
physically strong mothers for the greater welfare of society. ...
Id. at 158.
' See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2495.
160Id. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (footnote omitted).
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It is clear, however, that the "lines" drawn in Wade were never
as precise as Justice O'Connor implied. Justice Blackman remarked in
Wade that the state was free to regulate second trimester abortions "to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health."' 62 Two subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, Danforth and Bolton, asserted that states could not
apply restrictions to the performance of post-first trimester abortions
under the guise of protecting maternal health without a sufficient
showing that the statutes were narrowly drawn to support that interest. 6 3 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor should not have been surprised
at the Court's willingness to require that states apply these regulations
only to those segments of the trimester in which their interest is
64
advanced.
Whether the guidelines for permissible regulation drawn in
Wade were inherently flexible or have been softened through subsequent interpretations, it is now clear that these guidelines do not
constitute a precise mandate. The relevant inquiry, therefore, goes to
the effect of their flexibility. Justice O'Connor argued that it is now
impossible for a state to determine what constitutes a legitimate assertion of its compelling interest without thoroughly investigating current medical literature. 65 She accurately stated the impact of Akron
Center. The "blurring" of the lines drawn in Wade is the result of a
judicial readiness to rely on the recommendations of leading medical
authorities and to effectuate necessary modification. But that willingness to change does not unduly burden states' rights. Akron Center's
reaffirmation of Wade not only includes the constitutional protection
of a woman's right to choose to abort, but, because of Justice Powell's
refusal to retreat from the trimester framework, it also assures the
continued validity of a state's compelling interest in maternal
health. 6 6 Justice O'Connor should not have looked upon the majority's position as an intrusion upon state power, but rather as a clarification of the means by which the state's interest can be asserted.
That is not to say that the Wade framework is the perfect vehicle
for addressing the validity of abortion legislation. Justice O'Connor's

1'2See Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
163See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Danforth); supra notes 66-69 and
accompanying text (discussing Bolton).
164Additionally, the difficulties that courts have had in applying Wade's second trimester
framework with any consistency, see Note, supra note 3, at 998-99, indicate that the lines could
not have been as clearly drawn prior to Akron Center as Justice O'Connor apparently thinks.
105See Akron Center, 103 S. Ct. at 2506 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 2495.
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observation that Wade is on a "collision course" with itself is valid.
Technological improvements, in all probability, will advance, on one
hand, the point at which maternal health regulation will be upheld,
and push back, on the other hand, the point of viability, at which the
state may proscribe abortions altogether. This potential problem
underscores the fact that although both women's and states' interests
are presently protected, the means by which they are evaluated may
6 7
have to change to accommodate future medical advancements.
Even though there may be difficulties with continued application
of the Wade framework, Justice O'Connor's proposed alternative, the
undue burden test, is unsatisfactory in terms of affording judicial
protection to a woman's fundamental right. It is evident from her
opinion that regulations falling short of a complete prohibition of
abortion would not constitute an undue burden.'6 Justice O'Connor
is apparently not convinced that a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy is fundamental. She argues that Wade's stipulation that that right is not absolute leads to the conclusion that it is
something less.'6 9 Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he 'undue burden'
required in the abortion cases represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court can require a State to
justify its legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling state interest' standard." 7 0 Under this two-step approach, the plaintiff must
first convince a court that the burden imposed is substantial. If she is
unsuccessful, the state need only justify its regulation on a rational
7
basis standard. ' 1
The support for the application of an undue burden analysis to
abortion legislation is derived substantially from abortion funding
cases. 7 2 Regulations restricting the funding of abortions were held not
,67See generally Comment, supra note 62, at 1215 (focus should not be on fetal viability, but
rather on fetal brain waves as beginning of human life); Comment, Fetal Viability and Individual Autonomy: Resolving Medical and Legal Standardsfor Abortion, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1340,
1342 (1980) (suggests Supreme Court limit definition of viability to exclude survival with
artificial aid and that state legislatures "prescribe objective scientific criteria" by which viability
determination can be made consistent with Court's revised definition).
168 This view is in accordance with that expressed by Justice Powell. See Akron Center, 103 S.
Ct. at 2487 n. 1.Justice Powell also asserts that, under the dissent's approach, even if a regulation
is found to be unduly burdensome, it would be upheld as appropriate because of the state's
compelling interest in the protection of fetal life. Id.
169See id. at 2509-11 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
170 Id. at 2510 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
"I See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1008-14 (discussing and criticizing two-step approach).
,72See Akron Center, 103 S.Ct. at 2509 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1307-08 (N.D. I11.
1978), aff'd sub
nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). But see Akron Center, 103 S.Ct. at 2509 &
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to infringe upon a fundamental right because the woman's access 1 7to3
abortion is neither helped nor hindered by the financial restraints.
The Court therefore concluded that the right to abortion funding is
74 In
subject to less demanding scrutiny than a fundamental right.
contrast, the challenged provisions in Akron Center clearly hinder or
severely restrict a woman's access to an abortion. Justice O'Connor
incorrectly argues that the lessened scrutiny applied in the abortion
funding cases should be applied to Akron's legislation. 7 5 Justice
Powell properly determined that the legislative interference affected a
fundamental right and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
There is little dispute that a regulation which imposes an absolute
restriction on abortions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny under either the compelling state interest or the undue burden test. The
analytical framework becomes pivotal when the regulation is something less than a complete prohibition. Depending upon the analysis
selected and the Court's perception of whether the right infringed is
fundamental, states would have greater or lesser freedom to draft
legislation designed to protect their interests. There is a corresponding
decrease or increase in the freedom with which pregnant women can
exercise their constitutional rights. In Akron Center, the majority has
reasserted its belief that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is
worth the utmost protection the judiciary can provide.
Carla J. Crusius

n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing several Supreme Court decisions that did not involve
abortion funding which utilized language "undue burden").
113 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-76
(1977).
"I See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478
(1977).
175 Cf. Note, supra note 3, at 1011-12 (criticizing undue burden test).

